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1ABSTRACT
A methodology has been developed to provide system relia-
bility criteria based on an assessment of the potential radio-
logical hazards associated with a fusion reactor design and on
hazard constraints which prevent fusion reactors from being
more hazardous than light water reactors. The probabilistic
consequence analyses, to determine the results of radioactivity
releases, employed the consequence model developed to assess
the risks associated with light water reactors for the Reactor
Safety Study.
The calculational model was modified to handle the isotopes
induced in the structural materials of two conceptual Tokamak
reactor designs, UWMAK-I and UWMAK-III. Volatile oxidation of
the first wall during a lithium fire appears to be a primary
means of disrupting induced activity, and the molybdenum alloy,
TZM (UWMAK-III), tends to be more susceptible than 316 stain-
less steel (UWMAK-I) to mobilization by this mechanism. It
was determined that the radiological hazards associated with
induced activity in these reactor designs imply reliability
requirements comparable to those estimated for light water
reactors. The consequences of estimated maximum possible re-
leases of induced activity, however, are substantially less
than the maximum light water reactor accident consequences.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Decisions concerning the future methods of electricity
production must include considerations of the potential envi-
ronmental impacts and public safety hazards associated with
each option. A comparison of the relative environmental and
safety problems may influence the eventual choice of an energy
resource, and recognition and assessment of these hazards may
influence the development of resource technologies. There-
fore, it is important to examine the environmental and safety
aspects of fusion power reactors even though they are pre-
sently in an early and conceptual stage of development. There
have been several recent publications concerned with this
topic,1-6 and interest in fusion reactor impacts will inevi-
tably increase along with the viability of this technology.
Since a fusion reactor is a nuclear energy device, one of
the main safety concerns involves radiological hazards. The
radioactivity contained in a typical Tokamak fusion reactor
facility will be in three basic forms:
1) tritium
2) induced activity in structural materials
3) activated corrosion products
The radiological hazard assessment must examine the oper-
ational and accidental impacts on the welfare of plant person-
nel and the public, associated with each form of radioactivity.
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The routine operational hazards of radioactivity tend to be
dealt with at an earlier stage in the design process, with
accident analyses requiring more detailed total system designs.
If a methodology could be developed to evaluate possible
accidental hazards of conceptual fusion reactor designs, it
might serve to influence the development and evolution of
those system designs.
An actual risk assessment of fusion reactors would re-
quire detailed systems designs from which the possible acci-
dent sequences and their probabilities could be determined.
This approach would'employ event-tree and fault-tree analyses
similar to those used in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400)7
to assess the public risks associated with commercial light
water reactors in the United States. Since the available
designs for large commercial fusion power reactors are con-
ceptual in nature, determination of a comprehensive set of
reactor accident sequences and probabilities may not be feas-
ible. A reasonable alternative to the problem of hazard eval-
uation for fusion reactors may be to attempt to establish some
overall system reliability requirements which will assure that
the safety of fusion reactor designs will be at least as good
as other forms of power generation, such as light water re-
actors. Thus, some type of maximum tolerable accident prob-
abilities would be used to determine reliability criteria that
may be utilized in the evolution of fusion reactor designs.
In this work, a methodology will be presented to deter-
mine system reliability criteria which should prevent the
12
potential radiological hazards of fusion reactors from exceed-
ing those of commercial light water reactors. This methodol-
gy is explained in Chapter II and is demonstrated by an example
in the following chapters. The methodology utilizes the con-
sequence model developed for the Reactor Safety Study, the
"Calculations of Reactor Accident Consequences" computer code
8(CRAC), to calculate the probabilities of various conse-
quence magnitudes following a given set of conditions for
releases of radioactivity from a reactor containment. The
example analysis examines the potential hazards of the in-
duced-radioactivity in structural materials of Tokamak fusion
reactors. A similar approach may also be used to examine the
potential hazards of tritium, the other major form of activity.
The conclusions and recommendations of this study may.be use-
ful as guidelines in the continuing development of Tokamak
reactor designs.
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II. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The major steps in this methodology consist of the iden-
tification of the potential radioactive releases from a Toka-
mak reactor, the calculation of various consequences of these
releases, determination of maximum tolerable accident proba-
bilities which limit the potential hazards, and the establish-
ment of minimum reliability requirements for system designs.
Each of these steps is explained in the following sections of
this chapter.
2.1 Identification of Release Accidents
To determine the possible releases of activity, the in-
ventories of radioisotopes must be determined. For a Tokamak
reactor, the two major inventories of radioactivity are the
tritium and the induced activity in reactor structures. The
tritium is bred in the reactor blanket and used to fuel the
plasma. The induced activity results from the neutron acti-
vation of reactor structural materials. The induced activity
appears to present a potential public hazard only during acci-
dent conditions, assuming the normal disposal of activated
structures after their useful life in the reactor poses no
significant problems. The tritium, however, presents a poten-
tial hazard following an accidental release and during the
normal operation of the reactor due to its rapid diffusion
through materials, particularly at high temperatures.6 Both
14
forms of radioactivity may be important in an assessment of
the public and occupational hazards of a Tokamak reactor
facility, however, occupational and tritium hazards will not
be specifically examined in this study.
For any radioactivity to be a threat to the health and
welfare of the public, it must be released from the reactor
and the containment structures. The activity must be in forms
which can be dispersed from the reactor site into the environ-
ment. Accident sequences must be identified which are capable
of producing these releases, and each of these event se-
quences can then be analyzed to determine the magnitude of
the activity release and the conditions describing the physi-
cal release process. This part of the hazard analysis, how-
ever, is very dependent on the actual system design. Because
of the early stage of fusion reactor conceptual design, the meth-
odology followed in this work assumes that various fractions
of the radioactive inventory can be released up to a limit
determined by an analysis of an extreme accident. Hence, the
identification of potential release accidents involves the
determination of possible ranges for parameters used to calcu-
late the radioactive dispersion and radiological consequences.
2.2 Generation of Consequence-Probability Functions
The next major step in this methodology is to- utilize
the consequence model to calculate the best estimates for the
various effects or results of the identified release accidents.
The CRAC code requires the input of radioactive inventories
and other parameters describing the release accident, data
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describing population distribution about the reactor site,
weather conditions during the course of the accident, and dose
conversion factors for the health effects of the exposure to
various radioisotopes.8 The code proceeds to calculate the
probabilities of the magnitudes of various health effects and
economic costs resulting from reactor accidents. These con-
sequences are presented as a set of complementary consequence
distribution functions, which give the probability that the
magnitude of a specific consequence will exceed a particular
value. Thus, the complementary function is essentially a prob-
ability density function integrated from an arbitrary value
for the independent variable (consequence magnitude) to infin-
ity.
The original purpose of this code was the generation of
complementary cumulative distribution functions describing the
public risk associated with light water reactors in the United
States. These cumulative functions are essentially summations
of individual reactor accident consequence-probability func-
tions weighted by the probabilities associated with the speci-
fic accident conditions. For a specific set of site and wea-
ther conditions, a single given set of reactor accident para-
meters will result in a normalized or conditional complementary
distribution function. An example of each type of function is
shown in Figure 2.1. Therefore, a cumulative function is cal-
culated by weighting each of the conditional functions by their
associated site, weather and accident probabilities, then
summing over the complete group of accidents.
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For the present work, a set of cumulative functions are
generated for light water reactors (a pressurized water reac-
tor and a boiling water reactor) with specific site and weather
conditions, and pertaining to the complete set of accidents
derived in the Reactor Safety Study. These accidents represent
the spectrum of light water reactor accidents with significant
impact on public safety. The CRAC code is then used to gener-
ate conditional functions for a set of accident conditions as-
sumed to represent a range of possible releases from a Tokamak
reactor. The same site and weather conditions are used to a-
void their variable effects on the results. These conditional
functions are normalized to the assumed accident probability,
which, for this methodology, is unity. These two types of
functions are then used together to determine maximum tolerable
probabilities for particular types of Tokamak reactor accidents
under investigation.
2.3 Determination of Maximum Tolerable Accident Probabilities
The crucial step in this methodology is the determination
of accident probability limits for Tokamak reactors. The basic
technique consists of placing a light water reactor cumulative
function and the corresponding (same consequence) Tokamak reac-
tor conditional distribution function on the same graph. The
cumulative curve is plotted according to its functional values,
however, the conditional curve is placed below the cumulative
curve and is shifted upwards along the probability scale
(ordinate) until contact is made. Therefore, the conditional
curve remains totally beneath the cumulative curve,
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and the two curves representing the same health effect or eco-
nomic cost for the two reactor types, with the same site and
weather conditions, will have an appearance similar to Figure
2.2.
The ordinate intercept, P., of the curve representing the
conditional distribution function, is the maximum tolerable
probability for accidents with consequences exceeding those
represented by the particular conditional function. For ex-
ample, if a series of conditional functions are derived for a
range of release accidents with varying fractions of activity
inventory released, and the release fraction is the only vari-
able parameter, a complementary probability distribution func-
tion can be generated to provide the maximum tolerable proba-
bility or frequency for accidents with releases exceeding var-
ious fractions of the inventory. Figure 2.3.a shows the graph-
ical technique to obtain the intercept values for a series of
conditional consequence distribution functions representing
various release fractions, f . Figure 2.3.b shows the resulting
complementary probability distribution function for the maximum
tolerable accident probabilities. This methodology, therefore,
provides maximum tolerable accident frequencies, or system
failure rates, for release fractions which exceed various
values. These limitations on system failure rates can be used
to establish minimum system reliability requirements which, in
effect, limit potential radiological hazards of Tokamak reac-
tors to those determined for light water reactors.
Ci Cc
Consequence Magnitude
OF THE METHODOLOGY
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2.4 Establishment of Minimum System Reliability Requirements
If detailed system designs were available for Tokamak
reactors, and event and fault-tree analyses were possible, an
allowable accident probability or frequency of occurrence
would have a direct correspondence to a product of estimated
failure rates for sets of subsystems. Hence, reliability re-
quirements for subsystems or even individual components might
be directly inferred from these limitations on accident fre-
quencies, since a minimum reliability requirement is basically
an inverse of a maximum allowable failure rate or frequency.
Since Tokamak reactor designs have not yet reached the required
stage of development, the significance of the accident proba-
bilities is in their use as overall system design guidelines.
The evolution of Tokamak reactor designs will involve
decisions concerning required reliabilities for components
and the necessity of various safety-related systems. The max-
imum tolerable radioactivity release probabilities can estab-
lish targets for system designs, reveal the relative impor-
tance of public and occupational hazards, and may even reveal
the absence of a serious safety problem. This particular
example study will look at the potential radiological hazards
associated with induced activity in two types of reactor struc-
tural material; 316 stainless steel and a molybdenum alloy,
TZM. Not only may the release frequency limitations be of
value in the development of basic Tokamak system designs, but
they may also influence the choice of structural materials.
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III. POSSIBLE RELEASES OF INDUCED ACTIVITY
FROM TOKAMAK FUSION REACTORS
The examination of possible releases of induced activity
must begin with information concerning the amount and distri-
bution of radioactive isotopes in the reactor structural mater-
ials. Consideration of basic requirements for releases of
activity from the containment and the mechanisms that may be
capable of achieving these releases should lead to analyses
of particular accident sequences which pose the greatest po-
tential impact on the safety of the public. The most that
can be expected from these analyses at the present stage of
design development are possible ranges of release conditions
which can be used in the described calculational methodology
to determine system reliability requirements.
3.1 Induced Activity Inventories
During the operation of a fusion reactor, there will in-
evitably develop an inventory of induced activity, or activa-
tion products, in the first wall and blanket structures. The
amount and assortment of radioisotopes will depend on the na-
ture of the particle fluxes, the type of structural materials
and, to some extent, the duration of exposure to these par-
ticles. The designers of fusion reactor systems may attempt
to minimize the induced radioactivity by "isotopic tailoring,"9
however, the hazards associated with the disruption of the
lower radioactivity materials still need to be evaluated.
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The first concern in assessing the potential radiological
hazard of the induced activity is to determine the inventory
and distribution of activity in the reactor structures. Two
10 11
conceptual systems UWMAK-I 10 and UWMAK-III, will be used here
to exemplify the Tokamak-type fusion power reactor activation
problem. Studies have been made to determine the activation
products which will be induced during the operation of these
reactors. The two systems employ different structural mater-
ials (316 stainless steel in UWMAK-I and TZM in UWMAK-III), and
neither material was assumed to be tailored to minimize radio-
activity.
A calculational scheme has been developed at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin to determine the induced activity inventor-
12ies. The model computes the activity per kilowatt for each
radioisotope, which can then be divided by their maximum per-
13
missible concentration in air, (MPC), as given in 10CFR20,
to obtain a quantity known as the "biological hazard potential"
(BHP). The MPC values are determined by the best available
data on the biological effects of each radioisotope. When this
data is lacking, a conservative, or low, MPC value is used,
resulting in a high BHP value for the particular isotope.
Using the activity distributions obtained from reference
(14), a list of the significant isotopes was compiled for each
structural material. In compiling the list, any isotope with
a half life less than 30 minutes was excluded. Also, any
isotope contributing less than approximately, 0.01% of the
total BHP was excluded. The half life criterion was used in
24
the Reactor Safety Study to simplify the consequence calcula-
tion by greatly reducing the number of radioisotopes that had
to be considered. This was based onthe assumption that these
isotopes would contribute little hazard in an accident due to
the delay between shutdown and the time when the radioactivity
reached the nearby population. The change in activity between
shutdown and 30 minutes is relatively small for the inventor-
ies studied here. The significant isotopes are listed in
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 along with their activities and BHP values
in the reactor first wall and the total activated structural
material.
3.2 Requirements for Activity Releases
The Reactor Safety Study found that the single signifi-
cant form of activity release, for the public to be seriously
affected by a reactor accident, was that of a plume containing
volatile substances and airborne particulates. The plume is
formed by the release of materials through a ruptured contain-
ment and the transport and dispersal of these effluents by the
atmosphere. It seems reasonable to presume that the public
radiological hazards associated with the induced activity in
a Tokamak reactor would involve the emission of airborne acti-
vation products in the form of a plume. Thus, the basic re-
quirements for a hazardous accidental release of the induced
activity are assumed to be:
1) disruption of radioactive structures
2) breach of containment structures
3) transport of volatile or particulate forms of
25
TABLE 3.1
UWMAK-I Induced Activity Inventory in 316 Stainless
Steel First Wall and Blanket Structural
Material
(after 2 yrs. operation at 1.25 MW/m2 wall loading)
Isotopes First Wall Total Activated Material
Activit BHP Activity BHP
(Ci X 10~) (km3 air/KWth) (Ci X 10-4) (km air/KWth)
Mn54 7,730 15.46 26,680 53.36
Co58 11,690 11.69 44,930 44.93
Co57 3,302 6.604 9,689 19.38
Co60 817.0 5.447 2,371 15.81
Mn56 24,030 2.403 169,400 169.4
Fe55 34,790 2.319 98,600 6.573
Ni57 687.5 1.375 1,764 3.527
Zr89 26.86 0.5372 85.04 1.701
Cr51 15,480 0.3870 49,820 1.245
Mo99 1,051 0.3003 14,820 4.236
Nb96 14.57 0.2914 44.56 0.8912
Ni63 5.735 0.1147 42.25 0.8451
Fe59 22.67 0.02267 142.7 0.1427
Nb95 23.68 0.01579 70.99 0.04734
Zr95 7.280 0.01456 22.82 0.04563
Zr88 0.5375 0.01075 1.511 0.03023
Cr49 84.05 0.005603 209.7 0.01398
Tc99m 1,051 0.004204 14,820 0.05928
Total 100,814 47.00 433,513 322.2
Note: Table contains no isotopes with half lives less than 30
minutes and no isotopes with a first wall BHP value less
than approximately 0.01% of total first wall BHP
Data from reference (14).
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TABLE 3.2
UWMAK-III Induced Activity Inventory in TZM
First Wall and Blanket Structural Material
(after 2 yrs. operation at 2.50 MW/m 2 wall loading)
Total 64,494 39.60 64,494 39.60
Note: (1) Table contains no isotopes with half lives less than
30 minutes and no isotopes with a first wall BHP value
less than approximately 0.01% of total first wall BHP.
(2) Essentially all of the activated TZM is associated
with the first wall
Data from reference (14).
Isotopes First Wall Total Activated Material
Activit 3 BHP Activity BHP
(Ci X lo ) (km3 air/KWth) (Ci X 10~4) (km3 air/KWth)
16.67
8.510
8.360
4.480
0.6890
0.4390
0.1200
0.1160
0.0995
0.0502
0.0293
0.00940
0.00497
0.00438
0.00437
0.00407
0.00308
0.00301
0.00150
0.00149
Zr89
Mo99
Nb96
Nb91m
Nb9 5
Zr95
Tc99m
Y88
Sc46
Ca45
Zr97
Y90m
Nb9 2m
Sc47
Nb95m
Nb93m
Nb9 7
Sr89
Y91
Y90
833.4
29,800
417.8
224.0
1,033
219.3
29,910
5.792
39.80
25.15
43.92
0.4670
919.6
44.72
655.8
10.18
308.1
0.4511
0.7517
2.240
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radioactive materials out of the ruptured containments.
Each event or sequence of events which results in the satis-
faction of these requirements consists of processes by which
stored energy is released in an uncontrolled and destructive
manner. Thus, of crucial interest to any accident analysis
are the mechanisms capable of utilizing stored energy to bring
about a release of radioactivity.
3.3 Mechanisms Capable of Generating Releases
The Tokamak reactor system consists basically of a toroi-
dal vacuum chamber surrounded by large magnet coils, piping,
various auxiliary equipment, and structural members. The as-
sembly is encased in shielding and is enclosed by a contain-
ment structure. A schematic of a reactor system is shown in
Figure 3.1. A release of induced activity can only occur if
part of the first wall or blanket material is disrupted and
allowed to escape from the vacuum chamber and through any con-
tainment structures. The possible energy sources for the dis-
ruption of these structures appear to be the plasma, the magnet
system along with its liquid helium cooling system, the after
heat or decay heat in the first wall and blanket after shut-
down, and the liquid metal (lithium) coolant. A comparison of
the approximate magnitudes of some of these energy sources and
the energy requirement for vaporization of a molybdenum first
wall is shown in Figure 3.2.
The plasma, with a total energy on the order of 10 9J.,11
could melt or vaporize part of the first wall if a quench or
dump was sufficiently localized. A study of melting rates
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for sudden energy dumps15 showed that the stainless steel
would melt slower than molybdenum if no significant material
ablation takes place during the energy deposition. If mater-
ial ablation is important, however, the steel may have a higher
melting rate. This energy source itself would not be likely
to result in a breach of the reactor vessel and containment.
The much larger stored energy associated with the
11 11
toroidal magnetic field, which is on the order of 10 J,
could result in melting or vaporization of significant frac-
tions of activated structures if a localized energy dump could
16
occur. Recent investigations of magnet failures have shown
that the major effect would likely be the development of large
forces on some coils, which will most likely be directly sup-
ported by a structural frame. Also, there does not appear to
be a strong inductive coupling between the coils and the first
wall or blanket to produce significant Joule heating. It ap-
pears that the magnets may present their greatest threat to
the integrity of other structures such as lithium piping, aux-
iliary equipment and possibly the containment structure.
The helium coolant of the superconducting magnet system
could potentially cause structural damage due to thermal inter-
actions and overpressurization of the containment following
its vaporization.3 By itself, however, it does not appear
to be capable of disrupting activated material.
The decay heat inithe activated structures following shut-
down is less of a problem than that associated with decay heat
in fission reactors. The typical values of decay power at
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shutdown are about 2% or less of the thermal operating power.12
Fission reactors typically have decay powers greater than 7% of
operating power, and the decay power densities can be over 10
times greater than those of Tokamak reactors.1 7 Thus, the decay
heat in Tokamak reactors may be capable of causing some disrup-
tion, particularly in cases of large losses of lithium coolant,
however, it does not appear to be the major mechanism leading
to disruption of activity as the decay heat is in fission
reactors.
The lithium coolant inventory is capable of generating
large amounts of heat by interacting with air and concrete,
possibly resulting in great structural damage and mobilization
of induced activity. The heat generation is on the order of
10l - 1012J. per percent of lithium inventory spilled.1 8
Peak flame temperatures of approximately 2500 *K are theoreti-
cally possible, which could melt stainless steel, but not
molybdenum.3,18 The reactions with both air and concrete may
produce chemically reactive species of oxygen, hydrogen, and
nitrogen which are capable of attacking and possibly disrupting
activated structures.3 To summarize, in a recent study of To-
kamak power reactor safety,3 it was concluded that "lithium-
air and lithium-concrete reactions have the potential for gen-
erating large amounts of heat, significant pressures, and ac-
tive chemical species capable of volatilizing structural
materials such as a radioactive first wall."
Therefore, it appears that very serious possible accident
sequences involving large-scale disruption and release of
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induced activity may be initiated by a lithium spill or other
events which lead to a lithium spill. If the vacuum chamber
is ruptured and the first wall is exposed to a lithium fire,
first wall ablation could lead to the formation of a radioac-
tive plume. Convective currents within the containment could
transport volatilized radioactivity to a rupture in the con-
tainment building, which might also serve to allow an influx
of air to support the lithium fire. It is conceivable, under
these circumstances, that a measurable portion of the induced
activity might be released if the volatilization of the first
wall is extensive. It is therefore important to examine the
volatilization process more closely to determine the possible
extent of first wall disruption.
3.4 Possible Formation of Volatile Oxides Following a Lithium
Spill and Fire
A possible mechanism for the induced activity -to be exten-
sively disrupted and for the activity to be released from the
reactor site, is the formation of volatile oxide species. The
required high-temperature oxidation process could be initiated
by the generation of high-temperature gases during a lithium
fire in air, and the exposure of the reactor first wall to
these gases following a rupture of the vacuum vessel. The
specific accident sequences capable of both rupturing the re-
actor vacuum chamber and causing a lithium spill may involve
magnet system failures which seriously damage the reactor
structure. It may even be postulated that the accident leads to
generation of missiles causing a breach of the containment, and,
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thus, to its failure. Event-tree and fault-tree accident
analyses are required to determine the potential for such ac-
cident sequences.
The important requirements for first wall disruption by
this oxidation process are:
1) generation of a high-temperature oxidizing atmosphere
2) exposure of first wall to the reactive gases
3) poor oxidation resistance of first wall alloy material
4) rapid formation of volatile oxide species
In this study, it is assumed that the activity in the blanket
structures and the shielding are not readily mobilized by this
postulated accident, and that the activated corrosion products
will not pose as serious a problem being spread throughout the
entire lithium coolant and subject to possible coolant clean-up
systems. The two alloys which will be investigated are 316
stainless steel and TZM, whose nominal compositions are given
in Table 3.3.
3.4.1 Generation of High-Temperature Oxidizing Atmosphere
A recent investigation of lithium fires in UWMAK-III at
MIT indicates the possibility of creating high-temperature
atmospheres in the containment. This study employed a model to
determine temperature and pressure histories for lithium spills
into air and various other atmospheres. The MIT study also
used a chemical equilibrium model to determine theoretical
maximum flame temperatures for lithium reactions in air and
nitrogen. Some of the pertinent results are discussed in this
section, since the information will be used to assess the
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TABLE 3.3
Nominal Compositions of First Wall Alloys
Alloy (reactor design) Constituent Mass Percentage
Fe 62
316 Stainless Steel Cr 18
Ni 14
(UWMAK-I) Mo 3
Mn 2
Si 1
TZM Mo 99.4
(UWMAK-III) Ti 0.5
Zr 0.1
Data used from references (10) and (11)
TABLE 3.4
Peak Flame Temperatures for Lithium Fires with Melting
and Boiling Temperatures for First Wall Materials
Atmosphere Peak Flame Material Melting Boiling
Temperature Temp. Temp.
(*C) (*C) (*C)
air 2230 316SS 1450 2730
Mo 2600 4600
nitrogen 1040 Ti 1660 3290
Zr 1850 4380
Data used from references (18) and (19)
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potential for formation of volatile oxide species from both
316 SS and TZM first walls.
The significance of the peak flame temperature is that it
represents the theoretical maximum temperature that can be
generated locally in a lithium fire. These temperatures can be
used to assess the possibility of direct vaporization or melt-
ing of the first wall materials by a lithium flame. Compari-
sons of the calculated peak flame temperatures with melting and
boiling points of the alloys, presented together in Table
3.4, show that the melting of 316 stainless steel appears to be
the only direct result of the exposure of the two materials to
the flame of a lithium-atmosphere reaction (assuming the ther-
mal properties of TZM are very close to those of molybdenum).
Thus, if a fire took place within a stainless steel vacuum
vessel, some melting of the first wall may be possible. Melt-
ing of the first wall.would lead to further release of lithium
coolant into the reactor vessel, which may result in the de-
pletion of oxygen in the chamber atmosphere and could limit the
reaction rate to one controlled by the diffusion or convection
of oxygen into the vessel through any possible ruptures.
The melted stainless steel could mix with the liquid lith-
ium at temperatures approaching 1700 *C in a pool fire.18
These temperatures are sufficient to cause volatilization of
Cro 3 and MoO 3 (Section 3.4.3), however further investigation of
the possible interactions between liquid lithium and molten
stainless steel is required.
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The temperature and pressure histories for lithium fire
conditions analyzed in reference (18) reveal the potential for
creating maximum containment gas temperatures of about 1050 *C
in one hour or less after the onset of the spill and fire. 1 8
A sample of the gas temperature results is presented in Figure
3.3, which represents a "best estimate" case for a containment
with no specific fire mitigation features. The lithium spill
consisted of the total inventory of one of the eighteen blan-
ket sections of UWMAK-III, or 5.6% of the total plant inventory.
The atmosphere inside the containment was ambient air. It was
assumed, therefore, that there was no inert atmosphere to miti-
gate the reaction. The lithium-concrete reaction was not con-
sidered, assuming that the steel liners on the concrete surfaces
successfully prevented physical contact.
The important conclusion from these results is the creation
of high-temperature reactive gases. The chemical equilibrium
analyses showed that some free oxygen atoms would be present in
this atmosphere along with diatomic oxygen molecules, and at a
temperature of 1050 *C and low pressures (1 torr), the oxidation
probability for oxygen atoms at a metal surface may be almost
three orders of magnitude greater than the probability for oxy-
gen molecules.20 The effect of atomic oxygen on the oxidation
rate, however, would be less with significant pressures of other
species and the equilibrium gas mole fraction of atomic oxygen
appears to be only 0.002 for a lithium-air reaction.18 The im-
pact of these results on the formation of volatile oxides will
be discussed later in this chapter.
37
1200-
1000-
moo800-
00
E
400-
200-
0-
0 4000 8000 12,000 16,000 20,000 24,000
Time After Spill (seconds)
FIGURE 3,3 UWMAK-III CONTAINMENT GAS TEMPERATURE
HISTORY FOR A LITHIUM FIRE WITH NO
MITIGATING FEATURES
(FROM REFERENCE 18)
38
3.4.2 Exposure of First Wall to Oxidizing Atmosphere
To bring the first wall in contact with the high-temper-
ature gases produced in a lithium fire in the containment, the
vacuum vessel must be ruptured to allow the gases to penetrate
into the toroidal chamber. If a hole was created in the
vessel with its interior at an operating pressure of 10-5
torr,11 the gas pressure at the exterior would cause a sonic
flow to be generated at the break cross section until the
pressures were substantially equalized. In Appendix A.l of
this report, the possible time for this process to take place
is estimated. It is found that for a hole greater than 100 cm2
in area, the chamber may take less than 10 minutes to reach
the pressure level of the gas in the containment, and for a
hole greater then 1000 cm 2, it may take less than 1 minute.
The important point is that if activity volatilized by the
gases entering the reactor chamber is to be transported out of
the reactor, rather large holes will be required, and thus
the vacuum chamber will be filled quite rapidly for the condi-
tions of interest in this study.
In the case of a large hole being created at the start of
the lithium fire, it is seen from Figure 3.3 that it may be
possible that the-gases rushing into the chamber will not be
particularly hot, and thus would not present a serious problem
of disruption of material if convection currents within the
containment cannot bring hot gases into the reactor vessel.
If, however, the hole is very large or the vessel is ruptured
in a number of places which serve to circulate the hot
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containment gases through the vessel, both volatilization and
transport of activity may be possible.
3.4.3 Oxidation Resistance of First Wall Alloys
The best conditions for resistance of an alloy to oxida-
tion are the formation of a compact (non-porous) protective
oxide layer on the exposed surface, with further oxidation of
the base metal being controlled by solid state diffusion of
oxygen or metal ions through the scale. Alloys for high tem-
perature use in oxidizing environments should provide a strong
oxide scale with a high melting point, a relatively high nega-
tive free energy of formation to hold on to the oxide ions, and
low diffusion coefficients for metal ions and oxygen.22 To
assess the possibilities of first wall disruption the oxidation
resistance of each of the alloys should be examined.
i) 316 SS
The oxidation resistance of stainless steels is generally-
good at high temperatures.22 The presence of molybdenum as an
alloying element in 316 SS, however, may lead to a phenomenon
called "catastrophic oxidation," wherein alloying elements form
volatile oxides or oxides with low melting temperatures.
20
,
21
,
2 3
The melting point of MoO3 is 795 *C, and its presence in an
oxide layer can lead to the disintegration of the oxide at high
temperatures.20 The liquid oxide may dissolve other oxides,
and thereby accelerate the metal oxidation.20 In addition, pro-
tective oxide scales consisting of Cr203 can be oxidized to
CrO 3, which is volatile at temperatures above 1000 *C.23,24,25
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Molybdenum has been found to cause catastrophic oxidation
when added in certain concentration ranges to both iron-nickel
and iron-chromium alloys. In Figure 3.4, the shaded regions
indicate the metal weight loss (in mg/cm ) after 2 hours expo-
sure to air at 10000 C. It is seen on the iron-chromium-
molybdenum graph that an alloy of Fe-18Cr-3Mo should experience
a metal weight loss of about 112 mg/cm 2, which means that after
2 hours, 112 mg of the alloy have been oxidized per square
centimeter.
If the nickel content (14%) of 316 SS is assumed to have
no effect on this oxidation rate, then the stainless steel
first wall may be subject to rapid oxidation and volatilization.
The volatilization of MoO 3 would be expected at temperatures
above 7000 C,2 1 and CrO3 volatilization above .1000 *C.
Also, temperatures above the gas temperature can be reached
in the oxide and metal due to the rapid release of heat in
the oxide formation during catastrophic oxidation.20,23
If the weight loss taken from Figure 3.4 could be assumed
to represent a uniform oxidation rate over the 2 hour test
period, the time for total oxidation of the first wall exposed
to air at 10000 C may be estimated. In Appendix A.2, this
calculation shows that if catastrophic oxidation is to consume
the entire first wall at this constant rate, the wall would
be totally oxidized in 36 hours. This shows that the process
is rather slow for significant oxidation during an accident,
since the temperature of the gases in the containment will not
remain at 10000 C for more than several hundred seconds
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(Figure 3.3). In addition, the volatilization would involve
only some of the molybdenum and chromium in the alloy.
ii) TZM
The high-temperature oxidation of TZM is assumed to be
very similar to that of molybdenum. The small percentages of
-titanium (0.5%) and zirconium(0.1%) are assumed to have little
effect on the oxidation properties of molybdenum, though they
appear to be capable of adversely affecting the oxidation re-
22
sistance of metals. The formation of liquid and volatile
oxides of molybdenum can be rapid at temperatures above 700 *C,
thus significant amounts of TZM first wall may be disrupted
by this mechanism.
At high temperatures, molybdenum can be oxidized to a vol-
atile compound, MoO3' which evaporates from the surface at a
rate determined by the temperature of the metal and gas, the
gas pressure, and the gas flow rate along the surface.20
Figure 3.5 was constructed from data presented in reference
(20), and it is seen that increases in oxygen pressure, gas
flow rate, and temperature generally increase the surface re-
cession rate of molybdenum. The flow of gases along the sur-
face serve to remove evaporated molecules which can form a
boundary layer limiting the arrival rate of oxygen at the sur-
face.20 Thus, the reaction rate limiting effects of the
boundary layer are reduced with increasing flow rates. The data
presented in Figure 3.5 for flowing air represent the maximum
oxidation rates observed, thus, the surface recession rate was
limited only by the reaction rate at the surface.20 The partial
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pressure of oxygen affects the surface reaction rate, which is
greater in air (p02=0.21 atm) than in oxygen at 0.1 atm pressure.
The results presented in reference (18) reveal that following
the spill of lithium from a single coolant loop in UWMAK-III,
the oxygen gas mole fraction is reduced during the lithium fire,
but remains above 0.15. This study will assume that the high-
temperature gases in the containment remain essentially air.
The temperature also has a strong effect, with significant re-
action rates in air above 700 *C. The rate of volatilization
in air increases with temperature to a rate determined by the
surface reaction (flowing air) above 1200 0C, or to a rate de-
termined by the transport of oxygen through the volatile oxide
boundary layer above 800 0C. There does not appear to be a re-
action rate "saturation" effect for the 0.1 atm 02 data due,
probably, to the lower back-reflection rate, or higher molecular
escape fraction, for the decreased total gas pressure.20
The significance of these results for the study of first
wall disruption is that for air temperatures of 1000 *C, which
may be generated during a lithium-air fire, it is possible to
have a disruption rate of from 0.2 to 2.0 mm/hr, depending on
the flow of gases at the first wall. Since the outer or mini-
mum first wall thickness for UWMAK-III is 1.5 mm,11 this allows
for the total disruption or volatilization of the first wall in
air at 1000 0C in 45 to 450 minutes. Figures 3.6 shows the time
for total TZM first wall volatilization in 1 atm air for
various temperatures, given either stagnant or flowing air.
3.4.4 Maximum Estimated First Wall Releases
The important parameter for accidental releases of induced
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activity is the amount of the first wall which is mobilized and
transported out of the reactor containment. If it is assumed
that the material that is volatilized from the first wall is
eventually released from the plant, then the results of the
examination of high-temperature oxidation are directly appli-
cable. Maximum estimates for these release magnitudes are
desired to provide a range of possible release fractions for
the consequence calculations, thus, some arbitrary assumptions
will be made.
The release magnitude of 316 stainless steel activity will
be based on the fraction of the first wall oxidized by the
catastrophic oxidation process described in the previous sec-
tion. It should be recalled that this is actually not the
amount of material that is volatilized, but it should provide
an upper limit for the first wall mobilization. Total catas-
trophic oxidation of -the UWMAK-I first wall was estimated to
take 36 hours at 10000 C. The containment gas temperature is
not expected to be at or above this temperature for more than
1000 seconds as seen in Figure 3.3. Therefore, if a uniform
disruption rate is assumed, no more than:
1000 = 0.0077
36(3600)
or 0.8% of the first wall may be disrupted during this time
period. If convection currents, vibrations, stresses, or other
forms of disrupting action are assumed to be capable of accel-
erating the oxidation by dislodging some of the solid oxides to
form airborne particulates, it-may be conceivable to have
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additional material being released. Many complex processes are
involved in the eventual release of these materials from the con-
tainment, but it seems reasonable to limit the possible release
magnitudes to below 10% of the total UWMAK-I first wall.
The release magnitude of TZM will be based on the surface
recession rates described in the previous section. Since their
rates vary significantly over the temperature range of interest
(700-1000* C), an estimate which accounts for the temperature
change during the lithium fire will be required. A simplified
temperature history will be used for the calculation, and it is
basically a linearized form of the function in Figure 3.3. This
modified function is shown in Figure 3.7. The curves for the
recession rates in air, shown in Figure 3.5, will be simplified
to a line between the two maximum values at 700 *C and 1000 *C
on the semilog plot. This modified function is shown in Figure
3.8, along with the unmodified functions.
In Appendix A.3, a calculation of the estimated fraction
of the UWMAK-III first wall using these approximations reveals
that about 31% of the wall can be volatilized. Again, as with
the UWMAK-I first wall, if convection currents, vibration,
stresses or other disrupting actions are assumed to be capable
of dislodging some of the solid oxides which will form when the
gases in the containment cool to temperatures below 700 *C, it
is conceivable that additional material may be released in the
form of airborne particulates. A reasonable absolute maximum
release magnitude may be 50% of the total first wall.
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The maximum possible release magnitudes for the first
wall induced activities, shown in Table 3.5, will be used with
the consequence model to estimate minimum system reliability
requirements. The release limits establish possible
ranges for the release magnitudes and,at this point, it appears
that the TZM first wall in UWMAK-III may pose the greatest
radiological hazard to the public. It is important to re-
member that these release magnitudes were estimated with the
assumption that a lithium fire produces a gas temperature his-
tory similar to Figure 3.3. It has been shown in the MIT
18investigation of lithium fires, that with proper design of
reactor systems, the maximum gas temperatures may be limited
to substantially below 750 4 C, which is the temperature where
volatilization begins to become a significant problem. There-
fore, it may be possible to design a fusion reactor system for
which induced activity can not be volatilized and released
from the reactor containment. The reaction of lithium with
concrete was not specifically examined in this study, however,
and further work should assess its potential for disrupting
induced activity.
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TABLE 3.5
Estimated Maximum Possible Release Magnitudes
for Volatile Oxidation of Tokamak Reactor
First Wall Structures
Reactor Design First Wall Material Maximum Percentage
of First Wall
UWMAK-I 315SS 10
UWMAK-III TZM 50
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IV.. CONSEQUENCE-PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS
The CRAC computer code developed for the Reactor Safety
7Study (WASH-1400) is used to generate complementary probabil-
ity distribution functions for the consequences of releases
of radioactivity. A brief description of the CRAC code and
the modifications required for this study are discussed in
this chapter. The accident conditions assumed for the calcu-
lations, and the calculated results are presented for each
type of first wall material (316 SS and TZM) and for both
types of light water reactors (PWR and BWR). These calculated
consequence-probability distribution functions serve as the
basis for determining the maximum tolerable accident probab-
ilities, as described in Chapter II.
4.1 Description of the Consequence Model
A detailed desbription of the consequence model can be
found in Appendix VI of the Reactor Safety Study, and the
operation of the code is described in its user's manual. 8
A basic description is given in the rest of this section,
followed by a discussion of the modifications which were re-
quired to enable'the code to handle the radioisotopes not
already incorporated in its data sets.
A schematic outline of the consequence model is shown in
Figure 4.1. The starting point for the calculation is seen
to be the accident release conditions. The various parameters
involved in these conditions are:
i) the magnitude of the released radioactivity
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ii) the duration of the release event;
iii) the heat content of the plume;
iv) the release height above the ground;
v) the delay time and warning time (for evacuation)
associated with the accident sequence;
vi) and a probability for the occurrence of each cate-
gory of releases.
For commercial light water reactor plants, the spectrum of re-
leases were discretized into nine PWR and five BWR categories.
A meteorological model then computes the dispersion and
deposition of radioactive materials as a function of time after
the accident and distance from the reactor site. The model
incorporates factors accounting for the decay of the radioac-
tivity and includes the effects of thermal stability, wind
speed and precipitation in a Gaussian dispersion model. The
temporal variations of these weather conditions are obtained
by using samples from a year's weather data from various reactor
sites. Variations of the mixing layer are also included.
The effects of the plume lifting off the ground due to its
sensible heat content is included, and the plume is not allowed
to penetrate the mixing layer. The code has options allowing
for the specification of weather conditions independent of
the site data files.
Once the concentration of the radioactivity in the air
and on the ground is determined, the model calculates the pos-
sible doses from various modes of exposure. These include
external irradiation from the cloud and radioisotopes deposited
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on the ground, and internal irradiation from inhaled radio-
isotopes and from ingestion of contaminated crops, water and
milk. The distribution of people about the reactor site is
used along with an evacuation model to obtain a set of doses
for the affected population. These doses are transformed to
actual health effects (see Appendix B.2 of this report), such
as early (within a year) fatalities, early illnesses (serious
radiation sickness), cancer deaths and genetic effects. The
code also computes estimates for property damage or economic
costs for the accidents. These final results are used as a
measure of the accident consequences.
The final results are presented in the form of complemen-
tary probability distribution functions for the spectrum of
release conditions at various reactor sites using the spectrum
of weather conditions. The risk assessment for a large number
of individual reactor accidents is expressed as a set of com-
plementary cumulative distribution functions for each of the
potential consequences. For this study, as described in
Chapter II, cumulative functions will be generated for light
water reactors with their spectrum of release categories, and
conditional functions will be generated for Tokamak reactor
releases with the probabilitites for their occurrence assumed
to be unity.
4.2 Modification of Consequence Model
The modifications required to utilize the CRAC code with
first wall activity releases were basically the incorporation
of dose conversion factors for radioisotopes not already in-
cluded in the fission isotope data file. These dose conversion
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factors are used to determine specific dose values from radio-
isotope activity concentrations. The factors required for the
code are of two basic types; those associated with internal
exposure through inhalation of activity and those associated
with external exposure from activity in the air and on the
ground. Each isotope has a specific set of dose conversion
factors due to the nature of its radiation (a,a,y or x-rays)
and the energy distributions associated with each particle
or photon. The external dose conversion factors were obtained
from Oak Ridge National Laboratory,26 and were calculated with
the EXREM-III computer program. The inhalation dose conversion
27factors were also obtained from Oak Ridge, and were calculated
using the ICRP Task Group model. A detailed description of
these dosimetric models is given in Appendix VI of the Reactor
Safety Study.
At the time of this study, the dose conversion factors
for some of the isotopes listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 were
not available. However, from Appendix B.l of this report it
is seen that isotopes representing approximately 98% of the
total BHP of the requested 316 stainless steel inventory and
79% of the total BHP of the requested TZM inventory, were
received and incorporated into the CRAC code. A new data file
containing the dose coversion factors for these isotopes was
generated, and was accessed by the program during the conse-
quence calculations for releases of induced first wall acti-
vity.
The consequences calculated by this model fall into two
basic categories; those that result from the initial exposure
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of the population to the released activity during the short
times associated with the activity dispersal, and those that
result from long term chronic exposures. The long term expo-
sures require data for the behavior of the isotopes in the
environment and the human body over long time periods. Since
this type of data was not readily available for some of the
new isotopes, the consequences based on chronic doses were
not used in this study.
The consequences used in this study were the health effects
of the initial or early exposure of the population to the
radioactive cloud and the ground contamination during the evac-
uation and relocation time periods. The specific results which
depend solely on these exposures are early fatalities, early ill-
nesses, and initial latent effects (cancers) affecting various
organs. These are the only results which will be used to deter-
min the maximum tolerable accident probabilities for the Tokamak
releases. The doses required by the model for these health
effects are presented in Appendix B.2 of this report.
4.3 Accident Conditions
The model requires input to describe the conditions
associated with the release accident. The important input
parameters can be grouped into five categories:
1) population distribution around site
2) weather conditions during accident
3) magnitude of radioactivity release
4) description of plume formation
5) description of evacuation measures
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Each of these types of parameters has an important effect on
the eventual consequences, and the same population, weather and
evacuation conditions will be assumed for LWR and Tokamak
releases. The conditions directly involved in the releases
of radioactivity from the containment will be the only differ-
ences between the two reactor types, thus providing a valid
basis for comparing the consequences of releasing the different
radioactive materials.
4.3.1 Population Distributions
The assumed population distribution about the reactor
site was a uniform population density of 200 people per square
mile. The average population density of the United States
(including Alaska and Hawaii) is about 56 people per square
mile based on the 1970 census, and the most densely populated
state, New Jersey, has over 900 people per square mile. Thus,
the assumed population density is a reasonable value for many
areas in the country.
4.3..2 Weather Conditions
The atmospheric conditions during a release accident
strongly influence the dispersal of radioactivity. Appendix
VI of the Reactor Safety Study contains a detailed description
of the atmospheric dispersion model, and the important para-
meters used to estimate the dilution and transport capability
of the atmosphere are:7
1) wind speed
2) occurrence of rain
3) atmospheric stability (related to the temperature
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variation with altitude)
4) mixing height (for stable and unstable conditions)
The assumed conditions for the calculations were all chosen
to have a relatively high probability of occurring, according
to the data presented in reference (7). The values chosen for
the model are given in Table 4.1.
4.3.-3 Evacuation
The evacuation model assumes that a small radius around
the plant, about 5 miles, is evacuated when warning is received
(warning time is discussed later along with plume formation
parameters). In addition, a 45* angle sector centered about the
wind direction is evacuated out to a distance of 25 miles.
The evacuation velocity is assumed to be 1.2 mph, which was
used in the Reactor Safety Study to represent a reasonable
speed. The evacuation area is shown in Figure 4.2.
4.3.4 Release Description
This category of input parameters is the only one which
will vary among the reactor types. These parameters describe the
amount of radioactivity in the plume and the type of plume that
is formed. The fission reactor parameters are described in de-
tail in Appendix VI of the Reactor Safety Study and the isotope
inventory and release conditions used in this study for the light
water reactors are given in Appendix B.3 of this report.
The most important parameter for the Tokamak reactor
calculations is the fraction of the induced activity
inventory released from the containment. The examination
of the possible formation of volatile oxides during a
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TABLE 4.1
Weather Conditions Used in Consequence Calculations
Parameter Value or Condition
wind speed (m/s) 2.0
rain none
atmospheric stability neutral
mixing height (km)
stable 0.6
unstable 1.2
TABLE 4. 2
Tokamak Reactor First Wall Release Fractions Used
in Consequence Calculations - Percentage of First Wall
2 8 30 60 90
4 10 40 70 100
6 20 50 80
Direction of plume
FIGURE 4.2 AREA OF EVACUATION FROM SITE
OF RELEASE ACCIDENT
0
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lithium-air reaction in Section 3.4 suggested maximum values for
this parameter. These values were used to establish ranges for
possible releases, however, calculations were made for release
magnitudes up to the entire first wall inventory, since these
results would be of interest in an assessment of the hazards
associated with induced activity. The values assumed for the
release fractions are given in Table 4.2.
The remaining parameters required to describe the plume
formation and population distribution following the accident are:
1) time between reactor shutdown and activity release
from containment
2) warning time for evacuation before activity release
from containment
3) duration of release
4) release height
5) thermal energy release rate
It was determined in the Reactor Safety Study that a cold
release at ground level would maximize the acute or early con-
sequences due to the intense exposure at distances close to
the reactor where the radioactivity concentrations are still
high. On the other hand, hot releases from the top of the
containment would result in a rising plume which would reduce
the exposure of the nearby population to the high concentrations
of activity. The gas temperatures in the containment will vary
during the course of the accident, however, to achieve the
highest possible initial exposures, a cold release at ground
level is assumed for the Tokamak reactor consequence calculations.
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The duration of the release determines the length of the
plume and thus the initial dilution of the activity in the
direction of the wind. Also, for slow releases, temporal vari-
ations in wind direction will greatly reduce the concentration
of activity in.the plume. Again, to achieve the worst possible
health effects, a reasonably fast release with a total
duration of 1 hour was assumed.
The time between reactor shutdown and release determines
the initial decay of activity. The warning time- gives the
evacuation a start before the release begins. Assuming that
the warning is given when the reactor shuts down and the
release begins only one half hour after the shutdown, both times
will be equal to one half hour. Examination of Figure 3.3
reveals that this time corresponds approximately to a gas tem-
perature of 850* C if the lithium spill is assumed to begin
at reactor shutdown. At this temperature, significant volatil-
ization of molybdenum may occur, but this assumption implies
that the radioactivity is being released from the containment
almost immediately after it is volatilized from the first wall.
The input parameters for the Tokamak reactor plume
formation are given in Table 4.3. These will be used with
the various release fractions for both first wall radioactive
inventories. These conditions are expected to provide
consequences which represent an extreme for the initial
exposure of the population.
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TABLE 4.3
Consequence Model Input Parameters for Tokamak
Reactor Release Characteristics
Parameter Values
time between reactor shutdown 30
and release from containment (min.)
warning time for evacuation (min.) 30
duration of release (hr.) 1
release height (m.) 0
thermal energy release rate (cal/s) 0
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4.4 Results of Consequence Calculations
The consequence probability distribution functions cal-
culated by the CRAC model for the light water reactor and
Tokamak reactor accidental radioactivity releases are presented
in this section. The light water reactor results are in the
form of complementary cumulative probability distribution func-
tions which represent estimated radiological hazards associated
with the operation of these reactors on a site with the given
population and weather conditions. If the analyzed conditions
for the population and weather exist throughout the year, then
the probabilities are on a per year basis. The results cal-
culated for induced activity releases following a Tokamak
reactor accident are in the form of conditional complementary
probability distribution functions which represent the hazards
associated with a given particular accident, with a probabil-
ity of occurrence equal to unity. These are very different
types of functions, with the conditional functions essentially
providing single values for consequence magnitudes, while the
cumulative functions provide probability distributions. The
consequences for the TZM first wall releases will be slightly
under-predicted due to the isotopes not included in the model,
as described in Appendix B.1.
The health effects used in this study to measure the acci-
dent consequences are:
1) number of latent cancer fatalities due to initial
exposures
2) number of early fatalities (within a year)
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3) number of early illnesses
Appendix VI of the Reactor Safety Study describes the basis for
determining the doses required for these effects, and these
doses are presented in Appendix B.2 of this report. The final
calculated results are presented in Figures 4.3 through 4.5.
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V. MAXIMUM TOLERABLE RELEASE
PROBABILITIES
The basic methodology used to derive a set of maximum tol-
erable release probabilities for a range of release fractions
for the induced activity inventories was described in Chapter
II. This technique employs the results presented in Figures
4.3 through 4.5, which were calculated using the CRAC code
along with the accident conditions described in Chapter IV.
The possible ranges of the release fractions for the 316
stainless steel first wall in UWMAK-I and the TZM first wall
in UWMAK-III, which were based on the potential of volatile
oxidation to disrupt these structures (Chapter III),, can be in-
terpreted as defining the range of credible or conceivable
accidents involving the release of induced radioactivity. The
sets of maximum tolerable release probabilities, however, will
include values corresponding to various release fractions of
the first wall. The implications that the release probabilti-
ties have for system reliability requirements will be discussed
at the end of this Chapter.
5.1 Determination of Release Probability Limitations
The consequence magnitudes represented by the complemen-
tary conditional curves in Figure 4.4 and 4.5 are given in
Table 5.1. The values obtained for the maximum tolerable ac-
cident probabilities corresponding to each one of these con-
sequence magnitudes is given in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Each
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TABLE 5.1
Consequence Magnitudes for Tokamak Reactor
Induced Activity Releases
Percentage UWMAK-I (316SS) UWMAK-III (TZM)
of First latent early. early latent early early
Wall
cancer ill- fatal- cancer ill- fatal-
fatal- nesses ities fatal- nesses ities
ities ities
2 10 0 0 2.97 0 0
4 20 0 0 5.94 0 0
6 30 0 0 8.91 0 0
8 40 0.697 0 11.9 0 0
10 50 0.724 0 14.9 0 0
20 100 6.73 0 29.7 0 0
30 150 17.8 0 44.6 0.382 0
40 200 33.2 0.134 59.4 1.30 0
50 250 46.9 2.14 - 74.3 2.92 0
60 300 60.0 5.60 89.2 4.53 0
70 350 76.5 9.31 104 6.32 0
80 399 129 14.7 119 8.90 0
90 448 268 20.3 134 11.7 0
100 1260 496 46.7 149 15.2 [0.006
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TABLE 5.2
Probability Limits for UWMAK-I Releases Established
by Light Water Reactor Accident Consequences
Percentage PWR Probability BWR Probability
of First Limits Limits
Wall (per year) (per year)
latent early early latent early early
cancer ill- fatal- cancer ill- fatal-
fatal- nesses ities fatal- nesses ities
ities ities
2 10-5 1.0 1.0 2x10-5 1.0 1.0
-5 -5
4 10 1.0 1.0 2x10 1.0 1.0
6 10-5 1.0 1.0 2x10-5 1.0 1.0
105 10 1.0 2x10-5 -6
10 10 10 1.0 2x10 5x10 1.0
20 10-5 6x10 6 1.0 2x1-5 7x-7 1.0
-6 - 6 - 6 -730 9x10 6x10 1.0 2x10 7x10 1.0
-6 -6 -7 7 -7 -940 7x10 6x10 3x10 7x10 7x10 <10
-6 -6 -7 -7 -7 950 7x10 6x10 3x10 7x10 7x10 <10
-6 -6 3 7 -7 -7 -960 7xl0 6x10 3x10 7x10 7x10 <10
-6 - 6 < 7x-7 1 <10 -970 7x10 6x10 3x10 7x107  7x10 <1
8 x 6x10 3x10 lO 0 7 xl <10
-6 -6 -7 -7 -7 990 7x10 6x10 3x10 7x10 7x10 <10
-7 -6 - 9 -7 -9100 10 6x10 10 <10 7x10 <10
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TABLE 5.3 ,
Probability Limits for UWMAK-III Releases Established
by Light Water Reactor Accident Consequences
Percentage PWR Probability BWR Probability
of First Limits Limits
Wall (per year) (per year)
latent early early latent early early
cancer ill- fatal- cancer ill- fatal-
fatal- nesses ities fatal- nesses ities
ities ities
2 10-5 1.0 1.0 2x10-5  1.0 1.0
4 10-5 1.0 1.0 2x10-5 1.0 1.0
6 10-5 1.0 1.0 2x10-5 1.0 1.0
-5
8 10- 1.0 1.0 2x10-5 1.0 1.0
10 10-5 1.0 1.0 2x10-5 1.0 1.0
20 10-5 1.0 1.0 2x10-5 5x10-6 1.0
30 10-5 10-5 1.0 2x10-5 5x10-6 1.0
40 10-5 10-5 1.0 2x1-5 7x-7 1.0
50 10-5 6x10-6 1.0 2x10-5 7x10 1.0
60 10-5 6x1-6 1.0 2x1-5 7x0 -7l.0
70 9x10-6 6x10-6 1.0 10-5 7x10 1.06 10-  7x10-
-6 -6 -6 -7
80 9X10 .6x10 1.0 7x10 7x10 1.0
90 8x10-6 6x10-6 1.0 3x10-6 7x10 1.0
100 8x10 6 6x10 6 3x10 2x10 6 7x10 <10~9
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probability value is associated with one of the two first wall
materials, one of the two light water reactors, a particular
health effect, and with a specific release fraction. To in-
tegrate these results into a single complementary probability
distribution function for each first wall material which will
provide the maximum tolerable probability for accidents with
release fractions equal to or greater than a particular value,
a minimum probabilitiy associated with each release fraction is
required. This probability is simply the minimum value found
in a particular row for each release fraction in Tables 5.2 and
5.3. These minimum probability values assure that releases of
induced radioactivity will not imply a greater radiological
hazard than is inherent in either light water reactor type.
The minimum probability values associated with the release
fractions of both first wall activity inventories are presented
in Table 5.4.
The probabilities in Table 5.4 represent the upper bounds
of tolerable probabilities for accidents involving releases
which exceed certain magnitudes. The complementary probability
distribution functions developed from these tabulated values
are presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The regions beneath
these curves can be interpreted as "safe" or "allowable" com-
binations of accident probability and release magnitude. Thus.,
tolerable risks are associated with any system design with
failure rates and accident conditions which can be character-
ized by a curve or set of points in these regions.
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TABLE 5. 4
Minimum Probability Limits for Tokamak Reactor
Releases Established by Light Water Reactor
Accident Consequences
Percentage Maximum Tolerable Probability for Release
of First (per year)
Wall UWMAK-I (316SS) UWMAK-III (TZM)
2 10-5 l0-5
4 l-5 l-5
6 10- 10-
8 5 x 10 - 6  l0 -5
10 5 x 10 -6 l0- 5
20 7 x 10~ 10-5
30 7 x'10~ 7  5 x 10- 6
40 <10 9 5 x 10 -6
50 <10 9 7 x 107
60 <109 7 x 107
70 <109 7 x 107
80 <109 7 x 107
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90 <10 7 x 10
100 <10 -9<10~-9
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Release Fraction (percent)
FIGURE 5,1 COMPLEMENTARY MAXIMUM TOLERABLE
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
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76
14
55
-7
10
40.
0.
0
-
a.
1 0
0 I 
I I I I II
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Release Fraction (percent)
FIGURE 5,2
80 90 100
COMPLEMENTARY MAXIMUM TOLERABLE
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTION FOR UWMAK-III
FIRST WALL RELEASES
77
14
1-5
66
-(7
o-
.
- 8
10
0
78
An examination of the.two curves reveals a greater hazard
is associated with the steel first wall in UWMAK-I. Essential-
ly no releases larger than 30% of the first wall activity are
tolerable, while releases of up to 90% of the molybdenum first
wall in UWMAK-III can be tolerated. However, from the dis-
cussion of Chapter III, the release of stainless steel acti-
vation products appear to be more difficult to achieve. Both
of these maximum release magnitudes are deemed tolerable if
the probability of their occurrence is limited to below 10-6
per year.
The basic characteristics of the curves are similar;
they both show that all release accidents must be limited to
a frequency of 10-5 per year, and the maximum tolerable pro-
babilities vary between 7 X 10~ and 10-5 per year. These
probability values are similar to those associated with light
water reactor accidents involving radioactivity releases.
(See Appendix B.3) An important observation concerning the
release fractions is that the maximum credible releases deter-
mined for the first wall designs analyzed in Chapter III -are
within the tolerable regimes.
5.2 Implications for System Rdliability Requirements
The maximum tolerable accident frequencies essentially
establish minimum reliability requirements for the system
designs. The reliabilities of the various components must be
such that the release magnitudes cannot occur with a greater
frequency than is established by Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The
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various designs which will be developed for Tokamak reactor
systems may be analyzed to determine if they will satisfy these
minimum requirements, and the need for redundancy and engineer-
ed safety features can be assessed. An important observation
is that the apparent reliability that will be required in Toka-
mak reactor systems seems to be quite similar to the reliability
inherent in present light-water reactor designs, based on con-
siderations of the radiological hazards of induced activity.
More stringent reliability requirements may be established by
examination of the tritium hazard or by economic and operation-
al considerations.
A comparison of the hazards associated with the two first
wall materials, using only the results presented in Figures 5.1
and 5.2, might lead to the conclusion that the stainless steel
material is inherently more hazardous. It should be noted that
the volume of the first wall material is 2.2210,11 times larger
in the UWMAK-I design as compared to the first wall in UWMAK-
III, therefore, the inventory of steel activation products is
greater. In addition, it should be recalled that data for some
of the TZM isotopes were not available, and the inventory used
in this analysis represented only 78.5% of the first wall BHP
as contrasted to 97.8% of the BHP for the steel wall.
If a comparison of hazards associated with equal volumes of
each material is desired, an estimation for the maximum toler-
able release fractions may be obtained by applying appropriate
factors to the release fractions in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
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As an example of this type of comparison, the release
fractions of the UWMAK-I curve can be multiplied by 2.22 to
essentially reduce the material volume in the first wall.
Additionally, the release fractions of the UWMAK-III curve
can be multiplied by 0.785 to approximate the inclusion of
the total isotope inventory BHP. The two curves are presented
in Figure 5.3, and it is seen that the hazards associated with
equal volumes of the two materials employed in their respec-
tive reactors are approximately similar. It is important to
note at this point that the UWMAK-III design incorporates
layers of carbon on the plasma side of the TZM first walls
which reduce the activation rates,11 and therefore it is
expected that the hazards associated with an unprotected -TZM
first wall could be greater than the hazards predicted for TZM
in this study.
Thus, it appears that the reliability requirements asso-
ciated with the potential radiological hazards of the first
wall will depend on various aspects of the first wall design,
with the more obvious aspects being the volume and type of
material. An attempt to reduce the first wall volume will be
limited by plasma physics, neutron loading (radiation damage),
corrosion or structural considerations. However, first wall
volume-reduction represents an important means of minimizing
the radiological hazards.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Release Fraction (percent)
90 100
FIGURE 5,3 EQUAL VOLUME FIRST WALL HAZARD
COMPAR I SON
(ACTIVATION OF TZ1 REDUCED BY CARBON LAYERS
UWMAK-III DESIGN)
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Conclusions
The methodology employed in this study provides a useful
approach to the determination of Tokamak reactor system relia-
bility requirements based on radiological hazard limitations.
This technique may be used to investigate induced activity in
reactor structural materials, activated corrosion products, or
possibly even tritium. The results of an analysis are in the
form of complementary probability distribution functions giv-
ing the maximum tolerable probabilities or frequencies for
various accident conditions. These maximum tolerable proba-
bilities, which are essentially the reliability requirements,
will depend on the system design, the inventory and forms of
radioactivity, and the radiological release consequences used
to limit the hazards to an acceptable level.
The methodology is also capable of providing comparisons
of potential hazards associated with various designs, or with
options within a system design, such as the materials of con-
struction. Different forms of radioactivity within a system
design may represent various hazard levels, and a methodology
such as this one can provide the analytical basis upon which
different activity inventories are compared. Thus, the tech-
nique can be used to determine required system reliabilities
and to make comparative assessments of the potential hazards
of radioactivity in Tokamak fusion reactor systems.
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The examination of possible releases of induced activity
from a Tokamak reactor revealed that volatile oxidation appears
to be the most likely mechanism to disrupt substantial amounts
of radioactivity. The extent of first wall disruption is
strongly dependent on the first wall material, the oxidizing
gas temperature, and the flow of gas along the first wall.
Lithium-air reactions seem to be capable of creating the high-
temperature gases required for rapid oxidation and volatiliza-
tion processes. Stainless steel appears to be less susceptible
to volatile oxidation than TZM, and reductions in the gas tem-
peratures during a lithium reaction can prevent any first wall
mobilization. The extensive reactor vessel damage which seems
to be required for significant gas velocities on the first wall
surface may not be very likely due to the lack of a possible
mechanism for creating multiple vessel ruptures for gas circu-
lation. Altogether, it does not appear very probable that
significant releases of induced activity will occur.
An examination of the potential hazards associated with
the first wall induced activity in the UWMAK-I and UWMAK-III
designs, revealed that the estimated possible release acci-
dents result in consequences which are less than those asso-
ciated with light water reactor accidents. In addition, the
system reliability requirements established for the induced
activity hazards appear to be within the capabilities of
present technology, and are comparable to the reliabilities
estimated for light water reactor systems.
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The induced radioactivity in Tokamak reactor designs may
actually present little hazard to the public since the follow-
ing series of conservative assumptions were made in this study
to determine maximum possible releases:
1) a mechanism exists which may lead to releases of
induced activity from the containment - high-tempera-
ture volatile oxidation during a lithium-air reaction
2) the lithium inventory of an entire coolant loop
(UWMAK-III design) may be spilled into an air at-
mosphere
3) no measures are taken to mitigate the consequences of
the lithium fire
4) the vacuum chamber is ruptured with the first wall
immediately exposed to the high gas temperatures of
the lithium fire
5) The high gas temperatures cause catastrophic and vola-
tile oxidation of the first wall
6) the containment is breached
7) the oxidized material may be transported out of the
containment to form a plume
8) the plume forms 30 minutes after the reactor shuts
down
9) the plume is in the form of a cold, ground level re-
lease, maximizing the acute effects of initial ex-
posures
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10) the hazards associated with the maximum induced ac-
tivity releases must be less than the hazards associ-
ated with average light water reactor release acci-
dents
11) isotopic tailoring was ignored.
Using the conservative possible releases estimated with the
above assumptions, maximum tolerable probabilities for the
worst accidents involving induced activity in UWMAK-I and
UWMAK-III were between 7 X 10-6 and 10-5 per year. These
values are an order of magnitude above the estimated proba-
bilities for the worst light-water reactor accidents, which are
between 4 X 10~ 7 and 10-6 per year. In other words, it appears
that the maximum credible accident for a Tokamak reactor may be
allowed to occur ten times more frequently than the maximum
credible light water reactor accident.
6.2 Recommendations for Further Work
Further work in this area of fusion reactor safety should
involve the various aspects of induced activity and its dis-
ruption. These specific areas are:
1) Tokamak reactor designs which minimize or eliminate
the liquid lithium coolant, and thereby reduce the
potential and severity of lithium reactions
2) design features which could mitigate the consequences
of lithium fires to eliminate catastrophic and vola-
tile oxidation
86
3) lithium-concrete interactions and design features to
mitigate the potential consequences
4) oxidation kinetics and oxidation resistance associated
with various alloying elements
5) the hazards associated with structural materials other
than stainless steel and TZM
6) possible mechanisms for achieving radioactivity
releases other than volatile oxidation
Further efforts should also continue to develop a conse-
quence model which can handle isotopes associated with induced
activity. In addition, long term or chronic effects of induced
activity releases should be incorporated into the dose calcula-
tion models. Dose models for activation products might be
combined with a tritium dose model to integrate all potential
hazards of radioactivity for Tokamak reactors into one complete
radiological consequence model. Once a comprehensive model is
created, hazard assessments and system reliability requirements
for a great variety of release conditions is possible.
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APPENDIX A
CALCULATIONS FOR POSSIBLE RELEASES OF INDUCED
ACTIVITY FROM TOKAMAK FUSION REACTORS
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A.1 Time to Pressurize the Vacuum Vessel following a Rupture
To estimate the length of time to bring the pressure
within a ruptured vacuum vessel to approximately the same
pressure existing in the containment, the assumption of ideal
isentropic compressible flow was used. The governing equation
for the mass flow rate at a throat at sonic conditions is:
A P k+1th o k +
sonic +
where; a) rn is the mass flow rate at sonic conditions
sonic
in the throat (kg/sec)
b) Ath is the area of the throat (m 2
c) P0 is the pressure in a reservoir (N/m )
d) T is the absolute temperature (*K)
e) R is the ideal gas constant kg-*K
f) k is the specific heat ratio, C /Cv
To determine the possible pressurization time for a vacuum
chamber rupture in a lithium spill accident, a pressure of 1 atm
and a temperature of 1000 *C will be assumed for the above equa-
tion and the properties of air will be substituted;
thus, P 0 = 15 psia = 103,420 N/m 2
T = 1000 *C = 1273 *K
k = 1.32
R = 53.3 ft-lbf/lbm-*R = 287 N-m/kg-*K
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tsn. = 114.8 A kg/sec.
sonic th
The criteria for complete pressure equalization will be
assumed to be the time at which the mass of air contained with-
in the chamber at 15 psia and 1000 *C, is transported by the
sonic mass flow rate at the rupture, or:
tpressurization
m air in chamber
mair in chamber at 15 psia and 1000 *C
sonic
o chamber /Rair To
and,
V
chamber = approximate volume of the UWMAK-III
toroidal vacuum chamber 2 3000 m3
Thus, the length of time is estimated to be:
849 7.40 . 2press. 114.8 A A sec. (Ath m )th th t
= 
7 0,000/Ath sec. (Ath is cm 2 )
This estimated function for pressurization time is presented
in Figure A.l.
A.2 Estimated Time for Total Catastrophic Oxidation of 316 SS
First Wall in Air at 1000 *C
The time for the entire first wall to be oxidized, as-
suming the uniform oxidation rate from Figure 3.4, is:
toxid. = P316SS Sfirst wall/ (A) /At
where,
o 100 1000
Area of Opening (cm 2 )
FIGURE A.1 ESTIMATED PRESSURIZATION TIME
FOR RUPTURE OF VACUUM CHAMBER
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where, p31 6SS is the density of 316SS = 7.98 gm/cm3
6first wall is the first wall thickness
in UWMAK-I = 0.25 cm10
(Am/A) is the weight loss from Figure 3.4 =
112 mg/cm 2 = 0.112 gm/cm2
At is the measuring time = 2 hours
thus, tid 7.98(0.25) 36 hours
oxid. 0.112/2
A.3 Estimated Fraction of UWMAK-III First Wall Volatilization
From Figure 3.8, the simplified recession rate function
is of the form:
ln (x) = a(T) + b
or, x = exp(a(T) + b)
where, A = surface recession rate (mm/m)
T = temperature (*C)
a,b = constants
Solving for the constants by substituting into the equation
two points from the curve (end points);
a = 0.0117
b = -11.00
thus,
x = exp(0.0117T - 11.00)
The extent of first wall disruption can be expressed as
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ttotal
0 dt
1/2ttotal
2 exp(0.0117 T(t) - 11.00)dt
0
where, ttotal = 3000 seconds = 0.833 hours from Figure 3.7
T(t) = 700 + 720t *C, t in hours
thus, the extent of the disruption is;
0.833/2
x = 2 exp(0.0117(700 + 720t) - ll.00)dt
0
0.4167
2 exp(8.424t - 2.810)dt
0
8.424 [exp(8.424(0.4167) - 2.810) - exp(-2.810)]
= 0.2374 [2.014 - 0.0602]
= 0.464 mm
The UWMAK-III outerfirst wall thickness is 1.5 mm, thus
the estimated fraction of the first wall volatilized by oxidation is
0.464 = 0.31 or 31%1.50
or,
and
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APPENDIX B
CONSEQUENCE MODEL
INPUT PARAMETERS
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B.l Portion of First Wall Activity Inventories Incorporated
into Consequence Model
Dose conversion factors for some of the isotopes given
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 were not available for this study. The
BHP values associated with the missing isotopes are used to
assess the amount of the total hazard not represented in the
consequence model. Tables B.1 and B.2 give the isotopes that
were incorporated into the consequence model for each of the re-
actor first wall inventories. The first wall activities and
BHP values are given for each isotope, and the fraction of the
total first wall BHP represented by each set of isotopes is
also given.
B.2 Calculation of Initial Dose Effects
The acute effects of early exposures are the fatalities
and illnesses which occur within one year of the exposure. The
calculation of acute effects is based on individual organs,
and for each organ considered, the consequence model accumulates
the dose from each radioisotope and each exposure path; cloud
shine, inhalation, and ground exposure. The acute dose effects
are based on a three segment linear interpolation of dose re-
sponse curves. The model obtains a probability of an acute
effect based on doses to particular organs, but the process
allows a person to be a fatality only once. Synergistic
effects between organ effects are not included. The acute
dose effect criteria are input by specifying coordinates for a
dose response curve. The response curve is shown in Figure B.l,
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TABLE B.l
UWMAK-I First Wall Isotope Inventory
Used in Consequence Model
Isotope Activity BHP
(Ci x 10~ ) (kM3 air/KWth)
Mn54 7,730 15.46
Co58 11,690 11.69
Co57 3,302 6.604
Co60 817.0 5.447
Mn56 24,030 2.403
Fe55 34,790 2.319
Ni57 687.5 1.375
Zr89 26.86 0.5372
Mo99 1,051 0.3003
Ni63 5.735 0.1147
Fe59 22.67 0.02267
Nb95 23.68 0.01579
Zr95 7.280 0.01456
Tc99m 1,051 0.004204
TOTAL 85,235 46.31
from Table 3.1:
1) represented fraction of first wall activity is:
85,235/100,814 = 0.85
2) represented fraction of first wall BHP is:
46.31/47.00 = 0.98
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TABLE B. 2
UWMAK-III First Wall Isotope Inventory
Used in Consequence Model
Isotope Activity BHP
(Ci x 10 4) (km3 air/KWth)
Zr89 833.4 16.67
Mo99 29,800 8.510
Nb91m 224.0 4.480
Nb95 1,033 0.6890
Zr95 219.3 0.4390
Tc99m 29,910 0.1200
Y88 5.792 0.1160
Zr97 43.92 0.0293
Nb92m 919.6 0.00497
Nb95m 655.8 0.00437
Nb97 308.1 0.00308
Sr89 0.4511 0.00301
Y91 0.7517 0.00150
Y90 2.240 0.00149
Total 63,956 3.107
From Table 3.2:
1) represented fraction of first wall activity is;
63,956/64,494 = 0.99
2) represented fraction of first wall BHP is;
31.07/39.60 = 0.785
0 D
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TABLE B.3
Acute Health Effects Data for Dose
Response Curve (Figure B.l)
Health Organ Dose Break Points Probability
Effect (rem) Values
D D2 D3 D P P2
Early bone 320 400 510 615 0.03 0.5
fatalaties marrow
(death with-
in a year lower
after lowe
expoure)largeexposure) intes- 2000 5000 5000 5000 1.0 1.0
tine
wall
lungs 5000 14,800 22,400 24,000 0.24 0.73
Early whole 55 150 280 370 0.30 0.80
illnesses body
(requiring
serious lung 3000 3000 6000 6000 0.05 1.0
medical
attention) lower
large
intes- 1000 1000 2500 2500 0.05 1.0
tine
wall
Data from reference (8)
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with the input coordinate values used in this study given in
Table B.3. The Reactor Safety Study found that the important
acute health effects were associated with the doses to bone
marrow, lung, gastrointestinal tract, and the whole body.
Appendix VI of the Reactor Safety Study should be consulted for
details, and the doses given in Table B.3 are recommended
values for the model.
The latent effects of early exposures are also calculated
on an organ basis, though not necessarily the same ones as for
the acute effects. The cloud gamma ray shine and the early
ground exposure doses are accumulated for all the radio iso-
topes, and these are essentially instantaneous doses during the
reactor accident sequence. The inhalation dose is accumulated
over the life of the individual, and the model calculates a
dose for 10 time periods after the accident. The "central
estimate" for latent cancer fatalities due to early exposures
is used in this study. This model is explained in detail in
Appendix VI of the Reactor Safety Study, and it is an attempt
to account for the effect of dose rate and possible thresholds.
The data used in this study consisted of recommended values,
and it is given in Table B.4. The dose conversions are used to
determine the consequence magnitudes for various time periods,
and for various organs utilizing an organ compensation factor.
The total latent effects is the summation of cases over all
organs and time periods.
TABLE B.4
Latent Health Effects Data
Health Organ Time period dose conversion factors for latent health effects Organ
Effect (cases/million man-rem) compen-
sation
(time intervals in years) factor
<1 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 >80
leu- Bone 28.4 27.2 18.7 13.8 9.70 6.76 4.03 1.69 0.480 0.0 1.0
kemia marrow
lung lung 22.2 22.2 22.2 14.5 8.13 3.99 1.50 0.220 0.0 0.0 0.5
cancer
bone skeleton 6.87 6.70 4.95 2.60 1.62 0.910 0.420 0.127 0.010 0.0 1.0
cancer
cancer lower
of GI large 13.6 13.6 13.6 8.94 5.00 2.46 0.920 0.140 0.0 0.0 1.0
tract intestine
wall
breast 25.6 25.6 25.6 16.8 9.35 4.60 1.73 0.250 0.0 0.0 1000
cancer other
other organs 25.0 23.2 20.5 13.4 8.52 3.69 1.39 0.200 0.0 0.0 1.0
cancers
whole whole
body body 120.1 117.7 104.0 69.7 41.0 22.1 9.80 2.54 0.480 0.0 1.0
effects
Data from reference (8)
H0
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B.3 Isotope Inventory and Release Characteristics for Light
Water Reactors Used in the Consequence Model
The isotope inventory and release characteristics describ-
ed in the Reactor Safety Study for light water reactors was
used in this study to calculate the radiological hazard limits.
The input parameters for the isotope inventory are given in
Table B.5 and the PWR and BWR release characteristics are pre-
sented in Tables B.6 and B.7 respectively. The releases of
radioactivity are described by isotope group release fractions,
unlike the uniform releas-es assumed for the first wall induced
activities. These tables are also helpful to compare the
nature of the light water reactor releases to the characteris-
tics assumed for first wall activity releases in this study.
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TABLE B.5
Light Water Reactor Isotope Inventory
Isotope Isotope Group Activity
(Ci x 10~4)
Co58
Co60
Kr85
Kr85m
Kr87
Kr88
Rb86
Sr89
Sr90
Sr9l
Y90
Y91
Zr9 5
Zr9 7
Nb9 5
Mo99
Tc99m
Rul03
Rul05
Rul06
Rhl05
Te127
Te127m
Te129
Tel29m
Tel31
Te132
Sb127
Sb129
I 131
I 132
I 1-33
I 134
I 135
Xe133
Xe135
Cs134
Cs136
Cs137
Bal40
78.00
29.00
56.00
2400
4700
6800
2.600
9400
370.0
11,000
390.0
12,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
16,000
14,000
11,000
7200
2500
4900
590.0
110.0
3100
530.0
1300
12,000
610.0
3300
8500
12,000
17,000
19,000
15,000
17,000
3400
750.0
300.0
470.0
16,000
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TABLE B.5 continued
Isotope Isotope Group Activity
(Ci x 10~4)
Lal40 8 16,000
Cel4.1 8 15,000
Ce143 8 13,000
Ce144 8 8,500
Pr143 8 13,000
Nd147 8 6,000
Np239 8 164,000
Pu238 8 5.700
Pu239 8 2.100
Pu240 8 2.100
Pu241 8 340.0
Am24l 8 0.1700
Cm242 8 50.00
Cm244 8 2.300
Data from reference (8)
TABLE B.6,
PWR Release Characteristics
Release Release Time to Duration Warning Sensible heat Release Isotope group release fractions
cate- proba- release of time release rate height
gory bility (hr) release (hr) (cal/s) (M) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(per (hr)
year)
Pl 7 -3 -3PWR1-A 5xl0 7  2.5 0.5 1.0 3.62 x 10 25.0 0.9 WxO 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.05 0.4 3x103
PWRIB 4x10 7  2.5 0.5 1.0 1.19 x 106 25.0 0.9 6xlO3 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.05 0.4 3x10 3
PWR2 8x10- 6  2.5 0.5 1.0 1.18 x 10 10.0 0.9 7x10-3 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.06 0.02 4x10- 3
PWR3 4x10-6  5.0 1.5 2.0 4.20 x 105 10.0 0.8 6x10-3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.02 0.03 3x10-3
PWR4 5x10 7  2.0 3.0 2.0 7.00 x 103 10.0 0.6 2x10-3 0.09 0.04 0.03 5x10-3 3x10-3 4x10~0
PWR5 7x10 7  2.0 4.0 1.0 2.10 x 10 10.0 0.3 2x10-3 0.03 9x10-3 5x10-3 lx10-3 6x10~4 7x10-5
PWR6 6x10-6  12.0 10.0 1.0 0.0 10.0 0.3 2x10-3 8xl0 8x10 4 lxlO-3 9x10-5 7x10-5 lx10-5
PWR7 4x10-5  10.0 10.0 1.0 0.0 10.0 6x10-3 2x10- 5 2x10-5 lx10-5 2x10- 5 1x10-6 lx10-6 2x10 7
PWR8 4x10-5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 10.0 2x10-3 5x10-6 lxlO 5x10 lxlO6 lxlO~ 0.0 0.0
PWR9 4x10~4 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 10.0 3x10-6 7x10~9 lx10 7 6x10 7 lx10 9 lx10~1 1 0.0 0.0
Data from reference (8)
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TABLE B.7
BWR Release Characteristics
Data from reference (8)
CO
Release Release Time to Duration Warning Sensible heat Release Isotope group release fractions
cate- proba- release of time release rate height
gory bility (hr) release (hr) (cal/s) (M) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8(per (hr)
year)
BWRl lxlO-6 2.0 0.5 1.5 8.40 x 106 25.0 1.0 7x10-3 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.05 0.5 5x10-3
BWR2 6xl0-6 30.0 3.0 2.0 1.89 x 106 10.0 1.0 7x10-3 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.03 4x10-3
BWR3 2x10-5 30.0 3.0 2.0 1.40 x 106 25.0 1.0 7x10-3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.01 0.02 4x10 3
BWR4 2xl0-6 5.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 25.0 0.6 7x10~4 8x10~0 5x10-3 9x10-3 6x10~0 6x10~4 lx10
BWR5 lxlo 3.5 5.0 0.0 0.0 150.0 5x10 4 2xl0~ 6x10~ 4x10~9 8x10 1 2 8x1 0.0 0.0
